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China’s Outer Space Programme:
Diplomacy of Competition or Co-
operation?
Jayan Panthamakkada Acuthan
1 The beginnings of the Chinese space programme can be traced back to the research and
development  (R&D)  on  missiles  modelled  on  foreign  sources  in  the  late  1950s
reportedly  with  Soviet  technological  assistance  and  to  a  lesser  extent  with  some
knowledge of the US missile programme1. The politicians who played a critical role in
this  programme  were  Zhou  Enlai,  Lin  Biao,  and  the  Gang  of  Four2.  Zhou  and  Lin
believed that China's accomplishments in space would be translated into international
prestige. The Gang of Four's interest was based on their attempt to move the focus of
space  operations  from  Beijing  to  Shanghai.  In  1975,  the  developments  of  the
communications satellites were included in the State Plan. Under Deng Xiaoping, the
military  space  programme  focused  on  geo-synchronous  communication  satellites3.
These  satellites  combined  with  earth-imaging  satellites  were  vital  for  command,
control  and  intelligence.  The  first  geo-synchronous  communication  satellite  was
launched  on  April  8th  1984  aboard  the  Long  March  3  booster.  In  1986,  space  was
accorded the highest priority status in the technological programme. After a series of
small and medium-size rocket launches during the 1960s, a preliminary launch of an
intercontinental rocket was conducted in the early 1970s, but the first full range launch
test of an intercontinental rocket only took place more than nine years later, on May
19804.
2 The PLA’s ABM programme included the construction of two anti-missile systems: the
Fan Ji (counter-attack) 1 and the Fan Ji 2. A Fan Ji 3 was also designed but the Fan Ji
programme  reportedly  did  not  survive  the  chaos  of  the  Cultural  Revolution5.  PRC
aerospace  engineering  reports  from  the  mid-1990s  also  indicate  that  the  PRC  is
developing anti-missile or anti-satellite systems6.
3 Research and Development in rocket technology is the responsibility of the Chinese
Academy of  Space Technology (CAST),  while  the China Academy of  Launch Vehicle
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Technology (CALT) is in the charge of the development of space launchers. At present,
rocketry developments come under the Ministry of Aero-Space Industry (MAI)7. China’s
space  launchers  are  indigenously  built8 and  the  first  generation,  designated  Chang
Zheng (CZ) (Long March), placed China’s first satellite in space in April 1970. This made
China the fifth member of the world’s most exclusive international club, able to launch
a satellite into the Earth’s orbit. Since their early days, CZ rockets have considerably
evolved. One variation of the CZ series is the FB-1 (WW, Feng Bao or Storm) rocket
developed in Shanghai. One of its features is that it can launch more than one satellite
at a time. FB-1 rockets have launched six satellites from the time they came into service
to September 1988. Geostationary orbit launches are assumed by follow-on versions,
the CZ-3 and the CZ-4 rockets. CZ-3 rockets were put into service in 1984 and have since
performed all  launches to this  orbit,  with the exception of  the 1988 and 1990 CZ-4
launches of Chinese satellites9.
4 Most of the above rockets are launched from two launch sites operated by the China
Satellite Launch and TT&C General (CLTC), one at Jiuquan in Gansu province, the other
at Xichang in Sichuan province. A third launch site, near Taiyuan in Shanxi province,
does not appear in official Chinese publications as such, but was used for the launch of
CZ-4 rocket in September 198810. 
5 Chinese  development  of  satellite  applications  has  focused  on  the  fields  of  remote
sensing, communications, and space physics exploration. The CAST develops most of
the  applications.  The  majority  of  these  satellites  have  been  recoverable  remote
sensing11. China entered the international satellite launch market with the launch of
the Asiasat-1C in 1990, the Arabsat-1C, the Freja, and two Aussat satellites in 199212.
China  is  also  engaged  in  research  in  areas  such  as  high  capacity  communication
satellites  and  multipurpose  Earth  resource  satellites,  large  volume  and  long-life
communication and broadcast satellites, and ground application systems for satellites13.
In this  context,  China’s  space policy projects  the development of  all  types of  space
application satellite systems, as well as the building of a space station, a heavy launch
vehicle, and a space transportation system. Xie Mingbao, director of the China Manned
Space Engineering Office, was quoted as saying that China spent “18 billion yuan (about
US$2.2 billion) on the five spacecraft of the Shenzhou (Divine Vessel) series that have
been launched so far”14.  Annual  spending on the total  Chinese space programme is
difficult to ascertain. Joan Johnson-Freese, of the US Naval War College, estimates that
China spends US$1.4 billion-2.2 billion annually on space, but cautions against direct
comparisons  with  US space  spending because  of  currency conversions  issues15.  The
Chinese space programme still lags behind its US counterpart in terms of experience,
expertise and resources, but the Chinese regime is not sitting idle as the United States
continues to be the dominant space power16. It is likely that China has acquired from
the former Soviet Union the technical know-how to operate the direct ascent method
of satellite negation, similar to the co-orbital method of interception. The laser weapon
capability of blinding low-earth orbit satellites appears to be close to fruition. Certainly
there are no technological barriers to China developing such a system.
6 On October 15th 2003, at 9 am local time, at Jiuquan, China has launched atop a Long
March 2F rocket its first-ever piloted spacecraft by a “taikonaut”17,  the Shenzhou V;
thus  successfully  propelled,  after  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United  States,  into  the
exclusive  country  club  having  sent  a  man  into  space18.  On  October  16th  2003,
Lieutenant Colonel Yang Liwei, 38, stepped onto the grasslands of the Inner Mongolia
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Autonomous Region, ending his 21-hour journey as the first Chinese to travel into outer
space. He orbited the earth 14 times (21 hours and 23 minutes) travelling some 600,000
km. In mid-October 2005, astronauts Fei Junlong (40) and Nie Haisheng (41) were the
focus of a over a billion pairs of eyes as they stepped aboard the Shenzhou VI spacecraft
at the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center19. 
7 Space-related Intellectual Property Rights (SIPRs) is becoming increasingly important,
especially with the completion of International Space Station (ISS) 20. The ISS, one of
the most important examples of co-operation among space-faring nations, is the most
appropriate  test  case  for  reviewing  the  effect  of  the  regulatory  environment  with
respect to intellectual property rights in outer space. Can inventions made in outer
space be patented on Earth? Can the use of patented inventions be protected in outer
space? These questions would dominate among the experts in the years to come. 
Aims and principles of China’s space activities
8 The aims and principles of China’s space activities are determined by their status and
function  in  protecting  China’s  national  interests  and  in  implementing  the  state’s
development  strategy  as  contained  in  the white  paper  entitled  “China’s  National
Defense in 2002”21. According to the white paper, China implements a military strategy
of active defence. On arms control and disarmament, the white paper acknowledges
that after the end of the Cold War, a series of achievements were made in the field of
international  arms  control,  disarmament  and  non-proliferation.  In  the  current
situation, it is critically important to maintain the global strategic balance and stability
and the legal system governing international arms control and disarmament. China has
consistently advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical
weapons, biological weapons and nuclear weapons.
9 The  use  of  the  space  sector  ranges  from  civil,  commercial,  military  and  security
activities to securing space for peaceful purposes22. The principal aims of China’s space
activities are: to explore outer space, and learn more about the cosmos and the Earth;
to utilise outer space for peaceful purposes, promote mankind’s civilisation and social
progress  and  benefit  the  whole  of  mankind;  and  to  meet  the  growing  demands  of
economic  construction,  national  security,  science  and  technology  development  and
social  progress,  protect  China’s  national  interests  and  build  up  a  comprehensive
national strength. 
10 Some  experts  do  not  rule  out  the  possibility  that  China  may  also  proceed  with  a
military space station programme along the lines of that of the United States named
the Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) programme of the 1970s, which was finally abandoned. 
11 China carries out its space activities is accordance with the following principles23: 
12 –  adhering  to  the  principle  of  long-term,  stable  and  sustainable  development  and
making  the  development  of  space  activities  cater  to  and  serve  the  state’s
comprehensive  development  strategy.  The  Chinese  government  attaches  great
importance to the significant role of space activities in implementing the strategy of
revitalising  the  country  with  science  and  education  and  that  of  sustainable
development, as  well  as  in  economic  construction,  national  security,  science  and
technology development and social  progress.  The development of space activities is
encouraged  and  supported  by  the  government  as  an  integral  part  of  the  state’s
comprehensive development strategy;
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13 upholding the principle of independence, self-reliance and self-renovation and activity
promoting  international  exchanges  and  co-operation.  China  shall  rely  on  its  own
strength to tackle key problems and make breakthroughs in space technology.  Due
attention should be given to international co-operation and exchanges in the field of
space  technology,  and  self-renovation  in  space  technology  shall  be  combined
organically with technology import or the principles of mutual benefit and reciprocity. 
14 selection  of  a  limited  number  of  targets  and  making  breakthroughs  in  key  areas
according to the national situation and strength. China carries out its space activities
for satisfying the fundamental demands of its modernisation drive. 
15 enhance the social and economic returns of space activities and pay attention to the
motivation of technological progress. 
16 The Chinese government develops space technology, application and science through
integrated  planning  and  rational  arrangement  in  the  aim  of  promoting  the
comprehensive  and  co-ordinated  development  of  China’s  space  activities.  China's
distinctive  path  to  space  development  includes  both  military  applications  and
international co-operation. Countries involved with Chinese programme include Russia
and the former Soviet republics, the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Germany
and Brazil. An important characteristic of China's military space is that it relies heavily
on its co-operation with other countries. In the United States this co-operation caused
a  great  political  dispute  and  led  to  a  Congressional  investigation,  especially  in
connection with space launch market co-operation. 
17 “Now,  China  ranks  among  the  most  advanced  countries  in  the  world  is  many
technological  fields,  such  as  satellite  recovery,  multi-satellite  launch  with  a  single
rocket, rockets with cryogenic fuel, strap-on rockets, launch of geo-stationary satellites
and  Telemetry  Tracking  and  Command  (TT&C).  Significant  achievements  have  also
gained  in  the  development  and  application  of  remote-sensing  satellites  and
telecommunications satellites,  and  in  manned  spacecraft  testing  and  space  micro-
gravity experiments” 24. 
18 According  to  China’s  official  position,  outer  space  should  be  used  exclusively  for
peaceful purposes. China is therefore opposed to any militarisation of space, including
and especially space-based missile defence systems. China has made strong statements
against any type of arms race, including arms race in space. In both the 1998 and 2000
white  papers  on  national  defence,  China  called  for  the  creation  of  a  multilateral
mechanism to prevent an arms race in outer space. 
19 China  is  opposed  to  the  weaponisation  of  space  for  a  number  of  reasons.  Most
importantly,  Beijing  opposes  the  use  of  space-based  equipment  is  missile  defence
systems,  such  as  the  space-based  sensors  and  intercept  warheads  in  outer  space
potentially to be deployed is planed US missile defence systems. China is concerned
that the US deployment of missile defences, especially national missile defence (NMD),
will negate its strategic nuclear deterrent, potentially forcing China into an expensive
arms race that it cannot currently afford. Beijing’s focus on arms control in outer space
is an attempt to block future deployment of missile defence by the United States. 
20 In addition, as the United States rapidly improves its ability to deploy weapons systems
in space, China is concerned that this pre-eminence will enable the United States to use
this technology to achieve global dominance. China’s defence industry has seen the
difficulties in developing and absorbing new technologies and the cost of developing
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space-based sensors and weapons, Beijing worries it will be unable to match the United
States  for  an  indefinite  period  of  time.  Without  a  formal  multilateral  agreement
banning  the  deployment  of  space-based  weapons,  the  United  States  will  have  an
increasing strategic advantage for the foreseeable future. Moreover, Beijing is aware of
US preparation for future space warfare against China, as seen by various reports of US
war games with China as “enemy”. For example, in early 2001, a war game in Colorado
pitted the United States against an opponent threatening a small neighbour (i.e., China
threatening Taiwan), where both the two main countries facing off were relying heavily
on space assets. As a result of these reports, China increasingly views itself as the target
of US increased militarisation (and possible weaponisation) of space25.
China’s co-operation in outer space 
21 China for the United States and Europe will increasingly be a space competitor–both
commercially and politically in the Asia-Pacific region. It also means that China offers a
whole new range of space co-operation options. Europe is already increasing space co-
operation  with  China.  Germany  participated  earlier  in  Chinese  communications
satellite  development.  In  1994,  China  Aerospace  Company  and  Germany's  Deutsche
Aerospace  (now  DASA)  formed  joint  venture,  Euraspace,  to  build  remote-sensing
communication satellites.  The first was launched in July 1998. Alcatel in France has
signed an  agreement  with  the  Chinese  wherein  Alcatel  will  provide  the
communications payload for China’s  new communications spacecraft.  The European
Space Agency (ESA) has also begun work with China on the twin spacecraft Double Star
Science  Mission.  For  the  United  States,  the  same  issues  that  have  limited  other
exchanges  (technology  transfer,  human  rights  and  weapons  sales)  will  have  to  be
overcome before China can become a space partner26. 
22 Another joint venture was initiated in 1996 to build satellite electronics and ground
facilities  between Xi’an Institute of  Space Radio Technology and Canada's  Com Dev
Xi’an. In May 1990, Chinese and Russian industrial representatives signed an agreement
for co-operation on ten projects. In 1994, China and Russia signed a protocol for space
co-operation.  In  April  1996,  the  Russian  President  Boris  Yeltsin  signed  a  joint
understanding  on  space  co-operation  with  Chinese  space  officials  that  included
training Chinese specialists at Russia's cosmonaut training facility at Star City. By the
end of 1996 the Russian Space Agency was reported to be close to signing contracts
with China concerning commercial spacecraft launches, although it is unclear what the
outcome was. Similarly, details regarding a framework agreement between China and
Kazakhstan in 1998 remain elusive. The assistance from Russia and the former Soviet
Republics provides the greatest source of space co-operation for China, because Russia
does not place significant restrictions on its co-operation.
23 China's co-operation with the United States on a governmental level  in the area of
satellite technology has been chequered. The first delegation of space officials from
China  to  visit  National  Aeronautics  Space  Administration  (NASA)  was  in  December
1978.  The  priority  areas  the  Chinese  identified  were  the  purchase  of  a  domestic
communications  satellite  system  and  access  to  NASA's  earth  resource  sensing
satellites27.  The Chinese announced its intent to market its satellite launches on the
international  market  in  198528.  This  forced  the  Chinese  government  to  focus  its
attention on its relations with the United States. In fact, all commercial communication
satellites are manufactured by US companies or include US components which have
meant that export licences are required. 
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Outer space weaponisation 
24 Various efforts  to  contain  outer  space  weaponisation  have  led  to  multilateral
agreements29, which are in force. The important agreements are the Limited Test-Ban
Treaty (1963), the Outer Space Treaty (1967)30, the Convention on International Liability
for  Damage  Caused  by  Space  Objects  (1972),  the  Environmental  Modification
Convention  (ENMOD)  (1977),  and  the  Moon  Agreement  (1979).  China  is  neither
signatory  nor  party  to  the  Moon  Agreement  and  the  Environmental  Modification
Convention, but is a member of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (COPUOS) since 1981. Beijing has said it is not engaged in competition with
the other space powers. But weaponisation of outer space many not be a dominant
issue among the space-faring nations. There are technical issues which catch attention
such  as  dual-use  technology,  the  stormy  remote  sensing  regime  may  have  greater
implications in space policy-making in the future. 
25 China signed the 1967 Outer Space Treaty on January 27th 1967, ratified on July 24th
1970. China acceded to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty in December 30th 1983. The 1967
Outer  Space  Treaty  is  the  most  comprehensive  of  all  the  international  agreements
concerned with outer space, containing measures on both the peaceful uses of outer
space and arms limitation in that environment. The Outer Space Treaty is a weapons-
specific treaty, which prohibits, inter alia, the placing or testing of nuclear weapons or
any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction in outer space31. The Limited Test Ban
Treaty  and  the  Environmental  Modification  Convention  are  two  activity-specific
instruments that do not prohibit the placing or use of weapons in outer space but do
cover certain effects,  which the use of these devices could have on the outer space
environment. This includes the testing of any nuclear weapons or any other nuclear
explosion, as well as engagements in military or any other hostile use of environmental
modification techniques in particular circumstances. Other constraints on military use
of outer space, as mentioned earlier, include bilateral agreements undertaken between
the United States and the former Soviet Union, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
being the most important of such agreements to date.
26 There  are  problems  and  security  concerns  while  addressing  the  potential  military
activities covered by the present international regime. The Moon Agreement, which
contains some very important prohibitions of military use of outer space,  has been
signed or ratified by only thirteen states. As a result, the international regime on outer
space is not as extensive as it may appear. The problem of treaty adherence implies
that, among the major prohibitions related to weapons and other military use of outer
space, only those inscribed in the Outer Space Treaty are in force for the majority of
the  international  community.  Prohibitions  in  weapons-specific  agreements  do  not
comprise all possible forms of military use technologies. Major efforts to improve the
international regime directed to closing the gap regarding the placing into orbit  of
conventional or other weapons, which are not considered weapons of mass destruction.
These efforts coupled with initiatives to establish a total ban on research, production,
testing,  storage,  and  the  use  of  Earth  or  space-based  systems  designed  to  damage,
destroy  or  interfere  with  the  operations  of  objects  in  outer  space.  However,  these
initiatives are faced with major problems of political, military, practical and financial
natures, which countries have for years failed to surmount. 
27 The November 2000 White Paper of the People’s Republic of China included national
security as one of the purposes served by the space programme, and China’s remote
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sensing,  communications,  and navigation satellites  presumably satisfy  both military
and civilian objectives. Two Chinese satellites (ZY-2 and ZY-2B) are widely considered
in the West to be for military reconnaissance32. 
28 In its 2003 annual report on “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China”, the US
Department of Defense asserts that the human spaceflight effort eventually could aid
Chinese military space capabilities33. It also suggests that China may be developing a
direct-ascent  anti-satellite  (ASAT)  weapon,  systems  to  jam  US  navigation  satellite
signals,  and  ground-based  lasers  to  damage  optical  sensors  on  satellites.  China’s
interest in missile defences is likely long-standing, and may currently include interest
in developing NMD as well as defences against shorter-range missile systems. Zhang
Houying, a space application specialist at the Chinese Academy of Sciences explained in
February 2003 that Shenzhou spacecraft carry equipment for military surveillance. The
Shenzhou V carries a camera capable of a ground resolution of 1.6 metres.
China’s diplomacy on outer space issues in the United Nations 
29 China views current international  legal  instruments inadequate to prevent an arms
race  in  outer  space.  Consequently,  China  has  proposed on numerous  occasions  the
establishment of an Ad Hoc committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer
Space (PAROS) at United Nations’ Conference on Disarmament (UNCD). Beijing wants
this committee to be “an open-ended and all-embracing mechanism within which all
sides can freely express their own views”34.
30 The United States, however, has been resolute in its opposition to PAROS. The Bush
administration will most likely continue to avoid any agreement that could curtail its
plans to develop and deploy missile defence systems. In 2002 session of the UNCD, the
Bush administration seemed unwilling to alter its stance, even if it meant continued
stagnation on other issues such as a fissile material treaty. Officially, the United States
has opposed the formation of an ad hoc committee, in part criticising the ambiguity of
the  proposed  mandate.  Conflict  between  the  United  States  and  China  has  made
reaching consensus in the UNCD impossible.  While China has been persistent in its
efforts to keep the PAROS on table, the United States has been equally persistent in its
efforts to block it. As a result, China has blocked further work on a treaty to control
fissile material, which the United States believes to be a priority for the UNCD. This has
lead  to  stalemate  since  1997,  preventing  agreement  on  a  Programme of  Work  and
essentially stalling the work of the entire Conference. 
31 China softened its demands, showing willingness to settle for less formal discussion,
although with the continued understanding that the talks would be aimed at creating a
binding agreement. The United States, however, found this compromise unacceptable
since the assumption remained that the final product of these discussions would be in
the form of a formal agreement35. In May 2002, the delegations of China and Russian
Federation jointly presented a working paper to the UNCD, in the hope that all other
delegations will carefully study, support and co-sponsor this paper. Both delegations
again called for the establishment to an Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS at the UNCD, “so
as to start substantive work on the negotiation of such a legal instrument”36.  But in
September 2002, the UNCD once again ended its session without reaching an agreement
on a programme of work37. 
Future programmes
32 The  White  Paper  on  “China’s  Space  Activities”  released  on  November  22nd  2000
outlines a strategy for the short-term (next decade) and a strategy for the long term
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(next two decades). One of the objectives of China’s plan for manned flights and a space
station  is  to  further  space-based  military  strategies.  However,  the  exact  military
applications that the Chinese envisage are at best speculative at this stage. 
33 Chinese  scientists  have  predicted  a  Chinese  mission  to  the  moon  by  2010  and  are
planning missions to Mars. “We will be able to embark on a maiden unmanned mission
within  two  and  a  half  years, said  Ouyang  Ziyuan,  Chief  Scientist  of  the  lunar
programme, if the government endorses the scheme now”38. Huang Chunping, chief of
the Long March space rocket programme, has declared that “China has now solved
most of the manned space technology problems, and has the capability within three to
four years to step on the Moon. In fifteen years China will match the world’s top level
space technology”39. China also plans to build and orbit its own space station. Official
authorization to start its development was granted in February 1999 and, since then, a
test chamber has been built40. In March 2002, Zhang Qingwei, President of the China
Aerospace  Science  and  Technology  Corporation  (CASC),  declared  that  China  was
preparing  to  finalise  development  of  a  new  launch  vehicle  capable  of  carrying  a
twenty-ton  space  station  into  orbit,  to  be  launched  “at  an  appropriate  time  this
century”41. 
34 China’s space programme, like its nuclear programme, expanded from military to civil
uses. China  built  up  its  space  launch  capabilities  on  the  foundations  of  is  Inter-
Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMS) and the technology to improve their performance
from the United States. The manned space flight, therefore, must be seen in the context
of integrated civil-military benefits. In China’s short-term plan to 2010 integrated civil-
military observation and remote sensing capabilities from space may receive priority.
Establishing independent satellite navigation and positioning systems, so critical for
military missions, and surveillance capabilities from space are part of that plan. The
contribution of the Chinese space programme to the Chinese Inter-Continental Ballistic
Missile (ICBM) programme is difficult to quantify. The Long March family of rockets
includes 12 different types of launch vehicles that can deliver payloads into low-Earth
orbit  (LEO),  geo-synchronous  orbit  (GEO),  sun-synchronous  orbit  (SSO).  While  such
capabilities  are  impressive,  they  do  not  necessarily  translate  into  improved  ICBM
expertise. 
35 China is thought to be active in research an anti-satellite (ASAT) and other satellite
technologies but the true state of its research programme is unclear. Chinese satellite
and  space  programmes  are  a  nearly  indiscernible  mix  of  civilian  and  military
components and research which takes place at joint military and commercial facilities.
As China comes to rely on its own civil and military satellite systems, it will be faced
with the same vulnerabilities now faced by the United States. It seems uncertain that
developing  this  technology  is  of  great  interest  to  China  and  the  government  has
apparently committed considerable resources to satellite and space programmes. China
has been researching and developing ASAT technologies for several years but its degree
of  commitment  to  the  production  and  launch  of  ASAT  and  satellite  weapons  is
uncertain42. 
36 The short-term development targets (for the next decade) are briefly as follows:43
37 –  To  build  up  an  Earth  observation  system  for  long-term  stable  operation.  The
meteorological satellites, resource satellites, oceanic satellites and disaster monitoring
satellites  can  be  developed  into  an  Earth  observation  system  for  long-term  stable
operation to conduct stereoscopic observation and dynamic monitoring of the land,
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atmosphere, and oceanic environments of the country, the peripheral regions and even
the whole globe;
38 To set up an independently operated satellite broadcasting and telecommunications
system. Positive support will be given to the development of commercial broadcasting
and telecommunications satellites such as geo-stationery telecom satellites and TV line
broadcasting satellites with a long operating life, high reliability and large capacity, so
as to form China’s satellite telecom industry;
39 To establish an independent satellite navigation and positioning system;
40 To upgrade the overall level and capacity of China’s launch vehicles;
41 To  realise  manned  spaceflight  and  establish  an  initially  complete  R&D  and  testing
system for manned space projects;
42 To establish a co-ordinated and complete national satellite remote-sensing application
system  by  building  various  related  ground  applications  systems  through  overall
planning;
43 To develop space science and explore outer space by developing a scientific research
and technological experiment satellite group of the next generation.
44 The long-term development targets (for the next twenty years or more) are briefly as
follows:44
45 To  achieve  industrialisation  and  marketisation  of  space  technology  and  space
applications. The exploration and utilisation of space resources shall meet a wide range
of  demands  of  economic  construction,  state  security,  science  and  technology
development  and  social  progress,  and  contribute  to  increasing  the  comprehensive
national strength;
46 To establish a multi-function and multi-orbit space infrastructure composed of various
satellite  systems  and  set  up  a  satellite  ground  application  system  that  harmonises
spacecraft and ground equipment to form an integrated ground-space network system
in full, constant and long-term operation in accordance with the overall planning of the
state;
47 To establish China’s own manned spaceflight system and carry out manned spaceflight
scientific research and technological experiments on a certain scale; and 
48 To obtain a more important place in the world in the field of space science with more
achievements and carry out explorations and studies of outer space. 
49 Improved space-based surveillance could alter the military balance of power in Asia.
China  may  already  have  access  to  advanced  satellite  tracking  radar  (detection,
monitoring and targeting military assets)  as  well  as  to  anti-GPS (Global  Positioning
System) jamming technology. The European Space Agency (ESA) and European Union
(EU) have jointly developed the Galileo satellite navigation programme, which will rival
and perhaps outperform the GPS of the United States. Scheduled to be functional by
2008,  it  is  designed  to  provide  users,  ranging  from  aircraft  and  ships  to  surface
transport  vehicles  and hikers  and trekkers,  with  a  navigational  fix  accurate  to  the
meter.  Although  Galileo  is  designed  specifically  for  civil  purposes  and  is  a  real
alternative to the de facto monopoly of the military in outer space. China has already
invested heavily in this project.
50 An agreement has been initialled between the EU and China on its participation in the
Galileo programme in Beijing in September 2003. Pertaining to the EU-China Galileo
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Project, Loyola de Palacio, European Commission Vice-President in charge of Transport
and Energy, has explained that “The EU-China agreement on the Galileo Project will do
more than secure a promising future for Galileo and European business interests: it
opens  the  way  for  China’s  participation  in  the  Galileo  joint  undertaking and  a
substantial financial stake-holding of some 200 million euros”45. 
51 The US attitude towards China has to do with questions about the potential military
applications of its manned space programme. But over the five decades of space flight it
has been well  established that  reconnaissance satellites  are far  more effective than
crewed missions when it  comes to the military uses of space.  In any case,  it  seems
reasonable to assume that Chinese money spent on peaceful space endeavours—such as
participation in the International Space Station project and perhaps in joint missions to
the moon and Mars—is money not spent on the military uses of space46.
52 It is often argued that outer space technologies are not inherently harmful. This is an
important assumption. The scale of China's military programme, the progress made in
Chinese  technology  may  be  assessed  through  its  commercial  programmes.  The
commercial aspects of China's space launchers have been in the hands of the China
Great Wall Industry Corporation since the end of the 1980s. China's space budget was
estimated at US$1 billion in 200147. The United States have put tighter controls on the
export  of  sensitive  equipment,  and  banned  American  companies  launching  their
satellites  from  China48.  Outer  space  technologies  have  a  number  of  intrinsic
implications for international security, which seem to become ever more significant in
light of two major factors:49 one is an increase in the levels of technology acquired by
major outer-space competent states,  and the other is  the expanding access to such
technologies  by  emerging  outer  space-competent  states.  Concomitantly,  the  role  of
outer  space  applications  has  evolved  considerably  throughout  these  decades,
ultimately influencing the development of military doctrine and the various direct and
indirect military uses of these technologies. 
53 The series of satellites launched by China will have use in direct broadcasting, large
capacity communications, meteorological and oceanographic observations, navigation
and positioning, disaster mitigation, and seed husbandry. CASC offered five series of
satellites  which  include  retrievable  satellites.  Dongfanghong  (East  is  Red)  comsat,
Fengyun (Wind and Cloud) metsats, Shijian (Practice) science exploration satellites, and
Ziyuan (Resource) remote sensing satellites. The CASC is also responsible for building
and  launching  Beidou  (Northern  Dipper)  Navigation  Test  Satellites.  Research  and
development would raise these satellites to a new level in the coming decades. In the
area of large capacity comsats, CASC plans to accelerate research and development to
increase capacity, efficiency, bandwidth and life expectancy of the satellites to reach
international level50. 
54 For the remote sensing satellites,  successors will  have higher resolution imagers in
more spectral bands and a longer operating lifetime. China may use them to survey
natural  resources,  monitor  desertification  and  long-term  crop  growth  and  yield
estimates,  monitor disaster and pollution, project site selection and evaluation, city
planning, surveying and cartography. In the area of microgravity science, CASC will use
retrievable satellites to conduct experiments in space life science, space material and
new technologies, and space environment51. 
55 China has also made more then five-hundred microgravity experiments in aerospace
biology  on  nine  satellites  and  two  spaceships52.  It  has  new varieties  and  new seed
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resources of which the space breeding in agriculture,  microorganism and medicinal
fungus are leading the world. At present, many countries make efforts for developing
small satellites that have helped reap huge economic benefits in mobile communication
and natural  resources exploration.  Since China launched its  first  manmade satellite
Dongfanghong  I  in  1970,  the  CAST  has  succeeded  in  launching  various  types  of
satellites, including nine small manmade satellites. The SJ-5 in 1999 has helped advance
China to the world’s front rank in the small  satellites area. The CASC has taken an
important measure in furthering the reform and adapting to the development of the
market economy: the Aerospace Dongfanghong Satellite Co., Ltd, a hi-tech enterprise
jointly funded by the CASC and the Chinese Academy of Space Technology, will help
advancing industrialisation of production.
56 China’s launch of first manned flight into space on October 2003 brought about the
diplomacy of competition rather than co-operation in the space arena. In a sense, China
is ahead of Europe and alongside the United States and Russia as the real space powers.
China is also the first developing country to have achieved this. Moreover, China is also
making  new  overtures  to  join  research  on  the  International  Space  Station  (ISS).
Without  China’s  participation,  the  ISS  will  not  be  a  true  international  programme.
China's space programme clearly owes much to the Russian Federation. However, it is
not clear that Chinese manned programme could not have succeeded without Russian
assistance, albeit at a slower pace. 
57 The  primary  aim  of  China’s  space  activities  is  to  meet  the  growing  demands  of
economic construction, national security, science and technology development, social
progress, to protect China’s national interests and build up a comprehensive national
strength. In a country like China, anything linked to the military will encourage more
political support than something with no military application. China has an extensive
and well-developed programme for the exploitation of space. This has so far focused
almost  exclusively  on  developing  space  capabilities  for  “national  social-economic
objectives”. During the last two decades or more, China has joined bilateral, regional,
multilateral  and  international  space  co-operation  in  different  forms,  such  as
commercial launching service, which have yielded extensive achievements. The issue of
space debris is a big challenge to further expansion of space activities. The relevant
departments  of  China  pay  great  attention  to  the  problem,  and  have  carried  out
research  on  this  issue  with  related  countries  since  the  beginning  of  the  1980s.  In
addition,  China  has  participated  in  multilateral  co-operative  projects,  such  as  the
Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, World Weather Monitoring, UN Decade of
Disaster Mitigation, and International Solar Terrestrial Physics. 
58 The breadth of space technology development and its applications that China has set its
vision  on  for  the  new  millennium  certainly  evoke  a  great  deal  of  curiosity  and
admiration.  The  successful  Shenzhou  V  and  VI  missions  have  yielded the  desired
benefits  in  terms  of  domestic  legitimacy  and  international  prestige.  In  the  era  of
globalisation  and  information  and  communication  technologies  (ICTs),  the
industrialisation and corporatisation of outer space are hub areas. China will have to
develop more trained manpower in respect of computer technology especially software
in the realm of outer space. The increased privatisation, public-private participation
and space tourism may become the order of the day. While one might be tempted to say
that how the programme evolves needs to be watched, history also bears evidence to
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the fact that the Chinese already possess the political will and technological skill to find
their own way into deep space.
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RÉSUMÉS
This article looks at China’s outer space programme and its implications in terms of its military
and non-military applications. Being a huge country and a permanent member of the United
Nations  Security  Council,  China’s  launch  of  the  first  manned  space  flight  in  October  2003
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constitutes a landmark event. High-level technological capability, such as in space exploration,
add to a country’s power and bargaining capacity at international level. This article thus also
considers China’s quest for position vis-à-vis other space-faring nations. 
China’s Outer Space Programme: Diplomacy of Competition or Co-operation?
China Perspectives, 63 | january - february 2006
16
